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RECENT DECISIONS
ADOPTION - EFFECT ON ADOPTION PROCEEDING OF PRIOR CONSENT
OF PARENT - In 1923 the mother of an illegitimate child surrendered the
child to the Children's Home Society and signed an agreement consenting to
adoption by any parents chosen by the institution. In 1926 in an adoption proceeding, the child was adopted by the plaintiff's intestate with the society's
consent, but with no consent of the mother other than that given in 1923.
Upon the death of the intestate in 1936 the plaintiffs, the natural heirs at law,
brought suit to set aside the adoption proceedings as being void for lack of
parent's consent. Held, that the general consent given by the mother was insufficient because it neither identified the adoptive parents nor was given in the
adoption proceedings; therefore the proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. In re Holder, (N. C. 1940) IO S. E. (2d) 620.
Adoption proceedings are purely statutory,1 and although the statutes vary
from state to state, they generally provide that the consent of the parents to
the adoption proceeding is necessary. 2 But the character of the required consent
is a matter of statutory construction. Where a parent, upon the surrender of the
child to an institution or to specific persons, signs an agreement of consent to
adoption the courts do not agree whether the consent is binding on the parent
in a subsequent adoption proceeding. One line of authority holds that such acts
on the part of the parent amount to an abandonment of the child, and the
parent thereby forfeits all of his rights to the child including the right to object
to any adoption. 3 Since the parent's prior consent results in abandonment of the
child, no other consent to a subsequent adoption is necessary.4 Another line of
1 In re Jobson's Estate, 164 Cal. 312, 128 P. 938 (1912); Beach v. Bryan, 155
Mo. App. 33, 133 S. W. 635 (1911); In re Ziegler, 82 Misc. 346, 143 N. Y. S.
562 (1913); St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 189 Wis.
483, 206 N. W. 921 (1926).
2
In Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C. 201 at 207, 7 S. E. (2d) 625 (1940), the
court said, "it is not without reason that society looks first to the concern and foresight
of the natural parents in the selection for the child adoptive parents into whose hands
they surrender the duties and burdens of custody, training, and tuition .•••" In Luppie
v. Winans, 37 N. J. Eq. 245 (1883), the court held that it would not allow a construction of the statute to permit adoption of a child without the consent of the parents.
In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161 (1912); Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 86, 56 N. E.
303 (1900); contra, Haworth v. Haworth, 123 Mo. App. 303, JOO S. W. 531
(1907).
3
ln re McCann, 104 Pa. Super. 196, 159 A. 334 (1932); Weinbach's Appeal,
316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500 (1934); Hurley v. St. Martin, 283 Mass. 415, 186 N. E.
596 (1933).
4
ln re Larson, 31 Hun (38 N. Y. S. Ct.) 539 (1884), reversed on other grounds,
96 N. Y. 381 (1884); In re McCann, 104 Pa. Super. 196, 159 A. 334 (1932);
Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613 (1922); Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo.
173, 33 P. 23 (1893). The court in People ex rel. Lentino v. Feser, 195 App. Div.
90, 186 N. Y. S. 443 (1921), held that a parent can be afforded a hearing on the
issue of abandonment and cannot be precluded by an ex parte hearing.
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authority holds that a general consent is revocable by the parent if the court in
its discretion feels that the revocation is consistent with the child's welfare. 5
Conversely, if the revocation is not consistent with the welfare of the child the
general consent is binding on the parent.6 A third group of courts in agreement
with the decision in the instant case holds that a prior general consent is not
binding on the parent because it does not identify the adoptive parent or is not
part of the, particular proceeding.7 Although the interests of three persons are
involved in the adoption of the child, the first view favors only the interest of the
adoptive parent; the second, the interests of the child with some consideration
given to that of the natural parent; and the third favors only the interest of the
natural parent. There is some merit to each of these views. The first by favoring
the adoptive parent facilitates the placement of the child by the institution. The
third permits the natural parent to reconsider the advisability of giving up his
child to the particular adoptive parents. It would seem, however, that the second
view is the most satisfactory because in addition to giving consideration to the
interests both of the child and of the natural parent it carries out the purpose of
the adoption statutes-to promote the welfare of the child.8 Although the natural
parent of the child is not objecting to the adoption in the instant case, the court
follows the view which protects his interest. Thus by means of mechanical jurisprudence the court reaches a result which is probably contrary to the desires of
the natural parent, the child,.and the adoptive parent.9
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5 Chance v. Pigneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S. W. 640 (1926); In re Cohen, 155
Misc. 202, 279 N. Y. S. 427 (1935).
6 In re Miller, II9 Misc. 638, 197 N. Y. S. 880 (1922); Weinbach's Appeal,
316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500 (1934); In re Anonymous, 161 Misc. 371, 292 N. Y. S.
689 (1936).
1 Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C. 201, 7 S. E. (2d) 625 (1940); State ex rel.
Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956 (1921); In re Nelms, 153
Wash. 242, 279 P. 748 (1929); Davis v. Sears, (Tex. Comm. App. 1931) 35 S. W.
(2d) 99. Contra, Hurley v. St. Martin, 283 Mass. 415, 186 N. E. 596 (1933). The
court in the latter case held that a general consent given to an institution upon the
surrender of the child was binding even though the mother did not read the instrument before signing it. Morrow v. Brashears, 265 Ky. 203, 96 S. W. (2d) 434 (1936).
The conflict arises because of the difference of opinion of the courts as to the interpretation of the adoption statutes. One side holds that since adoption proceedings are
in derogation of common law, unless the statutes are strictly complied with the proceedings are void. The other courts hold that the proceedings are valid if there is
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.
8 In Leonard v. Honisfager, 43 Ind. App. 607 at 609, 88 N. E. 91 (:i:909),
the Indiana appellate court said that "The object or purpose of our statute relating to
this matter is manifestly to give to unfortunate children . • • the benefits of a home
and of such parental care, and the law should receive a liberal construction to effect
. this purpose." Bilderback v. Clark, I06 Kan. 737, 189 P. 977 (1920); Magevney v.
Karsch, 167 Tenn. 32, 65 S. W. (2d) 562 (1933).
9 Th.e instant case was decided under N. C. Consol. Stat. (1919), §§ 183, 184.
Sec. I 8 3: "The parent or guardian, or the person having charge of such child, or with
whom it may reside, must be a party of record in this proceeding." Sec. 184: "with
the consent of the parent or parents, if living, or of the guardian, if any, or of the
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person with whom such child resides, or who may have charge of such child ••• the
court may ..• allow such adoption ...•" In Truelove v. Parker, 191 N. C. 430, 132
S. E. 295 (1926), the court interpreted sections 183 and 184 to mean that the consent
of the parent or parents, if living, is necessary to make adoption legal. The consent
of the guardian or person in charge is necessary where both parents are dead. The
court also said that the parents must be made parties if living. In the Truelove case
the proceedings for adoption took place in 1 91 2. The quoted sections of the adoption
statutes were later repealed and have been replaced by N. C. Code (1935), § 191
(4) and (10). Had the proceeding in the principal case been under the more recent
statute, the result of the case would have been different, since § 191 (4) states that the
consent of the parent in the proceeding is necessary, provided "that when the parent,
parents, or guardian • • . has signed a release of all rights to the child, the person,
agency, or institution to which said rights were released shall be made a party to this
proceeding and it shall not be necessary to make the parent, parents, or guardian
parties."
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.3151(4) allowed the adoption of a child placed
in an institution only if the principal officer of such institution consented. This statute
was repealed in 1939, but was reenacted in the same form by the Michigan Probate
Code of 1939, Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp., 1940), § 27.3178 (542).

